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EDrnRS NOTE 
Arthur Wwkow is the a u k  of Tbe Limits of Dejmst,* a critical s d y  
of tbe various policies of deterrence held in the  Department of Dcfense. The 
bwk also p r o p e s  a form of disarmament which, in Waskow's words, "would 
advance liberty in the world" white providing a genuine security. Waskow, a 
fret-lance writer and former congesshal: legislative assistant, is a gduate  
student in American history at  the U n i e t y  of Wiiodn,  now completing 
his dkertarion on race riots. He is one af the authors in the American Friends 
Service Committee's sndy series, "Beyond Deterrence" 
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I n  No* on arnk 12, President M y  p r o d  u r guid. 
to American policy the slogan "Neither Red nor dud.'* Yet tk civil defense 
progrvn he strongly supports is the one d v a b l e  program thnt could rcntlt 
in America's being both dead and Red. 
Most critic& of tbe propwed civil defense program have not looked at 
it in ternur of deimate goals. The criticisms have f o c d  on minor questions 
of technique and have frequently been contradictory. Critics have argued 
that the p r o p  is tw small, that it should include k t  shelter8 as well os 
f&ut s b h ,  that ie depends too much on home shelters and too little on 
cornmunit). shelters, that it depends rim much on community h e l m  and 
too littIe on home shelters, that it haves foe much power to the states, that 
it hns granted too much power to the D e f m  Department, that it bas s t i r red  
up mch hysteria tbat some Axnericans are preparing to kill other Ameriuna 
in the name of civil defense and that it h a  not stirred up enough excitement 
to banish the apathy and indaerence to civil defense. 
But none of these criticism has gone to the real root of the trouble. The 
real trouble with civil defenge is that it will not work by the standards the 
President set up. To use his slogan as a benchmark by which to judge the 
civil defense program, its terms might be d & d  this way: "dead" to mean 
that all Americans would be dead wit& one year from the date that  a 
thermonuclear war began, ond "Red" to mean thnt American free enterprise, 
free speech and free elections had been wiped wt by an d-powerful c e n d  
government. 
Tf a civil defense program were to make R h c s s  and deadness IesP k l y  
fates for America, the program would be worthy of support; if civil defense 
were to  make either of these fates kss U d y  at  the price of making the other 
more likely, the program would require the most serious, soul-searching re- 
clumination, and if civil defense could be shown to make both Redness d 
deadness more IikeIy fates for America, then civil defense ought certainly to 
be rejected out of hand 
To app& civil defense intelligentIy therefore m p h  an amination of 
the effects a civil defense program would bave upon the likelihood of thermo- 
nuclear war; upon the kind, size, and survivability of a thetmonucIear war 
if it did come, and upon American free enterprise and political liberty. 
Civil Defense as D~llnge~ to Peace 
Since 1958 there hs been a stntggIe inside the Pentagon between two op- 
p o d  views of what American mihary strategy should be. Growing logically 
out of the two d t a r y  strategies are two opposed views concerning civd 
deft-ne that civil dcfcnse is a necessary part of the American military 
posture, and the other that civil defensc might endanger the stability of 
America's deterrent to Swict attack. Let u.9 examine these two strategies and 
their imnIicatiom. . 
The &st of these strategies is held mostly (tbough not erclusirely) by 
oficers of tbe Air Force. It is based on the belief tbat a controUcd, "lirni tEd" 
thmmonuchar war is possible. Its advocates are often called "counter-fore" 
strategists, because they believe that any nation would use its H-bombs 
against its enemy's military forces rather than agilinse enemy pplations. 
They Mieve that Russian miss& and bombers would k used mostly to at- 
tack hmicm misaile and hm&r bases, mthw tb;m large American citk, 
and that Amuica's a d c  strength would lx used in tk same way a g d  
the Rrrssiana Counter-force strategists believe that ehermonuclcar war w d  
be very much *old-fashioned, nineteenth-century war, in which every 
nation deliberately left its enemy's governmat and the bullc of his popu2atwn 
b, in order to have a government with which to negotiate terms of p e a ~ e  
and a &g d t p  fiom which to extract indemnities or &tory. The 
couuter-force view of war is thus &at of two military forces duelling wbile 
the rest of both zutiom watch and wait. 
Counter-force strategy n e e d y  assumes that military forces and the 
rest of the population are really separad from each other, so that an attack 
on forcei will not badly damage the population. The cnomous poww of the 
H-bomb makes essential not only a physical and geographical separation be- 
tween forces and populations, but protection of the civilian populationt by 
r n w  of civil defense. That is why counter-force strategists insist upon 
civil defense aa a part of the American militay pstum 
But what kind of civil defense does rhip mean? Hem sup- of counter- 
force strategy disagree, depending upon their idea of how a thermonuclear 
war is likely to begin. One view is that such a war would begin with a direct 
attack by the Soviet Union upon American bomber and missiIe haw. With 
whatever the United States had left, it would retaliate upon Soviet bas- and 
so the war would go on, thrust and parry, u n d  one side or the other bad 
shown its superiority and could demand the enemy's submission. In the mean- 
rime, mast of the American population would baw been waiting out the war 
in areas not directly exposed to b h t  and fLu. There would have been acci- 
dents and &sfwes, and some cities are sa close to imprtant bases that these 
cities would have been destroyed But wunter-force strategists calculate that 
prhaps no mare than 30,000,000 Americans would have died from direct 
attack in this stage. For everyone else, the chief danger wwld  be fallout, and 
therefore rhis =hml of counter-force strategists argues for the creation of 
ample fabut shelters for the  whole American population. 
T h e  second school of counter-force stracegists argues that thermonuclear 
war might well bcgin in anothcr way. They suggest that the Communists 
mighr attack important American inter-# without attacking the United 
States itself. For example, the Soviet Union might take over West Berlin ox 
mighr invade Western Europe, or China might invade Southeast Asia or the 
Chinese and Russian3 together might sponsor a Communist revolution in 
South America. In any of these cases, the United States mighr want to be 
able to rhreaan the Communists with punishment on their home ground. 
Thus the United States might be the h t  to use the H-bomb in this kind of 
war, &st to knack our Soviet military bases that might otherwise mtaliate, 
and then to strike perhaps one or two ppulation centers a a minor punish- 
ment for a minor provocation or against o whole series of c i t k  to punish 
a& a major provocation as invasion of Western Europe. 
Probably before taking an action like this the United States would issue 
an ultimatum to the Communists to withdraw their pmwative act or s d c r  
the consequences. But before issukg such an u l ~ t u m  or firing its h a -  
n u c k  w w p q  the Unitsd Scam w d  want to be able to protect its own 
population fmm xeprisal. It wodd therefore be mxssq for the government 
ro order evacuation of American c i b  in order to prevent tbe Russians fmm 
h d g  to d a t e  for any alack by an attack on wr large popuIation 
centers. It would be necessvp to prorect tbe people king evacuated agPinst 
direct H-bomb attack and therefore against 6re and blast as w d  as fallout, 
The hge numbers of people invdved would make it necessary co build huge 
undergmund cities insulated from firt and bkpt and capable of accommodat- 
ing large numbers of Amdcans. For thee  rtzsons, this second school of 
ruategisa urges that immediate attention be paid to building b h t  shelma 
md to m&g mngtmcnts fm *'stmt~gic evac~ation," mcadng evacuation 
more than one day in advance of the expected Soviet am&. 
Thus, in rhe hope of freeing American &wry forces to fight a tbermo- 
nuclear war more eeectivdy, counter-force stratcgista call for o propm of 
civil defense. 
Many of the u i d c s  of counter-force strategy are ogcera in the A m y  and 
Navy. They argue that if m y  thermonuclear war comes, it cannot possibly 
be the "limited" and wntroUcd kind of war that counter-force strategists 
expect. They h h t  that no nation can survive a thermonuclear war, and that 
MOE American milimry pwer must be so constructed as to deter any 
such war from beginning. They beIieve that a stable detcrrcnt---~ne that pre- 
vents any nation from striking first-wdd dew the defense of American 
interests by h i d - w a r  for- on I d  and sea. 
Stabledeterrent strategists argue t b r e  no themonuef ar war can possibly 
be contro1M. Thy argue that once a thmm&r war began, the bail of 
H-bombs directed agaiast dtq targem wmld destroy communications, 
prevent assessment of one% own or the enemy's damage and almost cer tain1y 
brmk down the command p- tbat pmxme the nation-state itself. Once 
the ps ib i ty  of mntrol was ht, thermonuclear bombs on bth sides would 
be f&g without regard to distinctions between people and military targets. 
Moreover, stabledeterrent strategists point out tbat the assumed g- 
graphical separation of people and forces is impossible to maintain. As missile 
bases become more and more numerous, dispexsed, mobile, secret and "hard- 
ened" against direct blast (d in hopes of making t b m  invulnerable to a 
&st strike and able to mount a retaliatory strike), the Soviets will be raising 
tbe  size pnd power of their weapons in an attempt to destroy these more and 
more invutnerabie bases. As rbe attacking weapons would grow more and 
more powerful, thqr would threaten more and more damage to populations 
at  some distance frorn Ground Zero. Thus the Atomic Energy Commission 
has calculated that a 100-megaton H-bomb would came a grmt firestorm 
over an area larger tban the state of Vermont. 
The last criticism of counter-for- strategy is the most serious. By aiming 
the attack a t  each side's atomic forct~, it w d  a great premium upon 
striking first. Whichever nation absorbed the fist attack would have its ability 
to retaliate greatly impaired. Both nations will see and understand this, and 
in any period of in- political crisis each wdI be extremely fearful that tbc 
other might decide to s t r h  &st, If either nation concludes that the other is 
about to st&, the prrssurer to strike first instead will bt enormous. 
3 
Thw stabbdmrcent straregists fe;u that a counter-fme strategy wwld 
be M y  to bring about a preemptive war, and that once the war beg= it 
would mount inevitably into a war against popddons as well as forces. Since 
t h y  fed any daermonuclear war would destroy America, they have tried to 
work out ways to deter such a war inst#d of winning it. They feel it b 
lutelg nectwzry that both rhe United States and the Soviet Union have every 
reason to avoid even the bare p W t y  of striking first with thermonuclear 
a r m  against the ocher and that the United Stares and the Soviet Union each 
know that &the 0 t h  feels this wav. Advocates of a stable deterrent believe 
the systeh will be stabk if both i reat  powcrs have an extxmely w d  p m  
tected ability to mount a rttrriiatory thermonuclear strike against the other 
(hg., Pokrir tdmwhw) and if both powers at  the same t h e  have no pt+ 
tection for their populations, industries and governments. The theory is that 
in tbis state of affairs neither nation would be willing to use its striking force 
&st, out of fear of overwhelming retaliation that would destroy its whole 
society. But, on the orher hand, ePeh nation would b willing to rtrike second 
since an attack upon it would so nwly destroy the country that mthing 
worse codd be expected in return for mounting an attack upon the aggressor. 
Thus both naeiom would be p n n r s e d  that the other would never inten- 
tionall y strike first. 
fngicauy, accepting this Strategy woutd mcan that the United Stat&- and 
the Soviet Union ought not to have any civil defense at all. Both mtiws 
would be publicly announcing their knowledge that thermonuclear war 
would mean total destruction for their own mcuty, Both nations, by basing 
their strategies on this knowledge, would bt offering ttKi entire populations 
- - 
as hostages to prevent thmmonuclear war. 
There is a second element in atable-demrcne thinking rbae would work 
against having civil defeme. Acceptance of the thermonuchr rtalernate 
would makc it necessary for the United Statw to strengthen iu limited-war 
forces in order to defend its interests mund the ghh, since the thrcat of 
thermonuctar punishment could not be used, The necessary mobiIization of 
money and men in su6cient amounts to make a limited-war force able to 
resist the greater numbers of the Soviet Empire w d  make it extremely dif- 
ficult to build n civil defense system at the same time. For thia xezpon, 
strategists who emphasize the need for a limited-war capability are dubious 
about the comparative usefulness of civil defense. 
The two sera tegies would have impor cant implications in foreign plicy, 
outside the field of purely miIitary affairs. Supporters of counter-force strat- 
egy say that civil defensc w d d  "stiffen the national will." By this they mean 
that if the United S t a w  had a civil defense system in optration, the American 
people and government would be more Uely to go to the brink of total war 
rather than negotiate in political crises like that over Berlin. Even if civil 
defense would not actually prevent national destruction, the M e f  of large 
segments of the population and government that it would protect l ive might 
force some future administration into a more kUigerent stance. 
Thus counter-fore strategy and civil defense go hand in hand with a 
brinksf-war foreign policy, while the stable detwrcnt would h d  to a for- 
eign plicy more interested in negotiatiw and modention. It  would be p- 
sible from a stable-deterrent Ation to move in the direction of anm c w t d  
or d i m a t ,  but it wou f d be i m p i b l e  in ehe counter-force atmosphere 
of a constant arms build-up d impding preemptive war to discuss  am^ 
control or &atmarmat dausly. 
Deciding for or against civil defem is crucial to choosing ktw- war 
a d  pace, since there is involved the choice betwem counter-fwce strategy 
and the stabIe deterrent. Counter-force strategy leads toward thermonuclear 
war without in fact easing the impact of that war u n America. The stable 
detunnr, which reqvirr. that no c i d  defense be d, &era nr last r short 
respite in the arms race and the  chance of a period of negotiation. For t k  
itasons, one major defect of civil defense is that it leads to war. 
Ciuil Defense rir u Danger to Life 
Supporrers of civil defense rwt their case u p n  tbe belief that a civil d t f u ~  
program could save a number of American lives in case of thermonuclear war. 
In examitring that belief, it t m u y  to ask first whether civil d e f w  
would make a difXerencewhether it w o d  in fact save any lives at dl- 
and secondly whether civil defense might actually increase the number of 
deaths from a rhetmonuclear war. In making thia analysia tht key factors art 
what the war and its aftermath would be like and what the civil defense 
shelmr system would be like. The interrelation of b two factors would 
determine how many would survive a t t a e ~ u c l w  war. 
Even a thermonu&ar war that be@ with an attack upon d t a r g  bass 
is practically sure to degenerate inro a disordered, desperak attack against 
the whole nation. Communications wouId surely be one of the &st casuaItiea 
of a thermonuclear attack. It w d  k exuemefy W a l t  even to assess the 
damage to American fore- caused by the first strike against us. Missilemen 
in one county would probably have no way of discovering whether the m i d e  
basw in the next camty are still capable of &ing. To get any c h r  picture 
of what damage WE have done the enemy w d  be enomrously more W c d t  
Assuming that an. A m c r i c ~  government were still functioning after the h t  
attack, it would have to try to give orders without knowing its own surviving 
defenses, the power Ieft to its own striking arm or the enemy targets still 
requiring theruetion. 
In fact, such B government may have great di&cufty in delivering its 
orders at  dL Electric wammbion h, radio towers and telephone instah- 
tiom would all have been knocked out. J d g  devices would be used by the 
enemy ta prevent orders to fire from reaching their destination. Thtta mall 
group of atomically armed forces would be left to make ehtir own decisioar 
about how to attack the enemy. Meanwhile, some American cities would 
have been destroyed, either because they were roo c h  to h i l e  bases or be- 
cam of inaccuracy in aiming md Gng.  Some field commanders would de- 
cide to take revenge by aiming their missiles a t  enemy cities. Others might 
believe from the k3 situation that the United States had been defeated and 
tbat there was no option but mrrender. S d I  others, without orders and mu- 
rounded by h, might succumb to insane fear and h a d  and end up dring 
H-bombs at -thing in sight. The same p m s  would be tacoking place on 
the eacmy sidc, with tbC d t  that a t t a c h  would bE deIihtcly motrntcd 
.mi- - S u m  of tbt atta %&-- itl m piEcOe protected ba=, would have been 
mound with 50-mcgawa and 100-mptw bomb& Tk vmnont4id 
b t o r m  predicted by & A& Energy . . mresultfromatch 
w ~ ~ ~ w l d m e a r r a h ~ i n ~ m o s s 6 r e w h o t t h a t i t w ~ ~ k i a  
oxygen from iu entire pctimetcr in hurricane-velocity winds and wwld 
bum even maferiPLP that am nw n~mrpllp mbustible, thus desp'oying prpe- 
t i cdy  d life within its mcb, Citits that were mih away from auch in~r~h- 
riona as Nike-Zm bass which the encmy would try to destroy would k 
tlumselvc~ wipcd out aa a byproduct. Highways and raihada would bc & 
atroyed or made weless, madical supplies would bc destroyed and medical 
peaonncl would be killed or disabsd. From multi-megaton bombs that were 
tither accidentally or intentiwnliy exploded in the air, m i l k  of hnkma 
up to several hundred miIes away would have h blinded. Thus many of 
thoec who would be necmary to help the critically i n j d  or to H#p order, 
mtablish communications and k t  rescue operations d d  themdm 
be helpk and requiring attention. 
All thh would have occurred within minutes of tk &st thermonuclear 
attack. Assumiag a fallout shelter system had betn constructed, millions of 
Americans would had for their nearest shelter. Mauy would never make it 
h a u s e  of fire, immdate high &don, choked strsets, automob& ~cci- 
dtnm and so on. But millions would get to the dm, m d  a t  this point the 
second factor-the nature of the shelrer program-would cwne into egect. 
Much has becn written about the d y  or immorality of p m t q  
nugbbors from entering one's own fallout shelter. The dilemma is stpfkly 
clwr. Either unauthoriPRd entrants will have to bc turd  away, or their 
presence will bring about their own deaths and t h e  of the Icgitimate OCCU- 
pants. A shelter that has been prepared for a two-week stay for five rLe 
with the bare survival necessities of food, water, air a d  sanitation am- 
ply not suppore 8ix peopk for & stay necessary to avoid & fallout dmger. 
But what has not bsen u n d e r d  is that p~~cisely this same di- 
lemma applies to canmunity shelters. A sheIter p r c p d  for 300 pwsons can- 
not accept more. It will be cxtremdy &cult to keep extra people uut of a 
W t e r  that bas been built in a public place with public funds, but if ertm 
m ~ 1 e  we allowed to enter thev will brine d d  with them. 
is not easg to eh- betwhen the mhitia Nevertheless, in case of war 
the choice will hnvt to be made on the spur of the moment by anyone who 
could establish himself as shelter Ieader. Whatever his choice, he will have 
camnous dsculty in pernunding all oecupta of tk Mtu tbat he is right, 
cgpeeially if ht chooses exclusion and m e  of those excluded haw family tits 
with &ow admitted. The result will be that from the &st moment of the 
stay in the shelter the qwtim of leadership is likely to be hotly and probably 
violently d e b a t h d  where this ia SO, the prohbility of survival h& 
two we& in a lndcrhr or divided shelter is low. 
Xle~pire tbeEe p m b h  in making thdr way to and gming inside a fdmt 
shelter, if the civil defense program had been sizable millions of Ametiuns 
wwld probably find themseIves inside, bedding down for a two-week stay 
untiI the fabut bad ettltd m earth At this point the problem of shelter 
life would cause more deaths and e d t i e s .  AU the evidence from catastrophe 
situations k &at everybody s d w  foa his f d y .  Since aImrrst 
a11 American fd am separated during the b y ,  a daylight attack wwfd 
mean b t  of husbands, wives and c&n would have to decide 
whether to stay in their shelters, daperate without knowledge of their fam- 
ilies, or to attempt to leave in the hope of seeking thun out. But In attempt 
to lcave might danger not o d y  having but evergone the in the shelter 
because of the fdlout outside, unless speciaI and expensive arrangements were 
d for *-tight exips. Thus the Mrcr  leadership might have to make a 
second major decision a b u t  permitting departure. A third major ethical 
problem would confront the leadership if occupants k a m e  violently insane, 
or w o k  others by screaming in ttaeir nightmam, or grew deliriously sick 
Should such "anti-social" unfortunates be repe~fdly drugged, or killed out- 
right, if drugs were m c c  ox absent? h r  every such decision would in- 
d v e  mom1 choices so =cult and so basic that opposition wwM be aroused. 
Wherever an oppai$m developed, leadership problems would multiply. 
Simply cleaning up the shelter from the results of mas diarrhea and nausea 
(always tbe first response to disaster) ~ n d  then rationing space, fwd, water, 
medical m p p b  and access to toilet would require a b r i h t  leader, several 
W e d  lieutenants and complete eoopefatiw. Previous knowledge of the 
n m a r y  arrangements, the ability to command respect and a feel for &&g 
with overwhctning crisis would be absolutely awcntia1 in every shelter leader 
md in most of his lieutenants. Any shelter tbat found itself without such a 
leader would be unlikely to survive, and a shelter in which there were two 
such men might bave di6culties if the two k a m e  Iepders of opposing fac- 
ths. Cantending with such extreme di&cdties, mPny shelters would un- 
doubtedly succumb to apathy ar to itratioad vioIence, In many c a w  a sociPI 
cohpse would interrupt access to air, food, water and sanitation. It could 
only be expected tbat many who had gone into the shelters would never 
come out. 
When they did come out, some might h d  the bomb stiU falling. It is 
interesting that pmponents of civil defense mume a single thermonuclear 
attack fohwed by two weeks of quiet for the radioactive dust w settle, after 
whkh it would lx safe to come out of the shelter. It is more likely that 
enemy missiles would be aimed and timed before the war to go ofl d-aut* 
matically at  s tagged intemals. A government might well do this in order 
to be able to threaten furthw attacks (aimed at shelter-ieaving ppdations 
on D-plw-14) if a surrender were not forthcoming. Any such possibility 
would make grim farce out of alf civil defense p i b i l i t i e .  
Nevertheless, Iet us Pssume that for one reason or another tht bomb have 
stopped when the food rum out and people h v e  tbeir shelten. What would 
they come out to? The social fabric of America wouId be ripped to shreds. 
Even if food bad been stored Idorehand, a trip to the storage center would 
be necmaary co get it. Highways would be bIocEcad, *line would bave 
burned or exploded and railroad tracks would have been torn up by blast; so 
it wmld l i m y  K neceas;up to walk to get food. Water m a i n s  and dam3 
would have broben and pdcat ion p h t s  been abandoned, so that pmcticaIly 
no artificial water systems would be working. Most of the available clothing 
would have burned or beti contPminafed by f h t .  If it had d y  been 
muminad, washing w d  d m  it usable, but without water, washing 
would be impossible. If people came out of their shelters into d d  wcatbpr, 
some kind of heat and housing would lx essential, but most of the housing 
would bave been destroyed or contaminated, and fuels wwId h v e  hen de- 
stroyed or made inaccessible. Disease would be rampant, &ce sewage ]in- 
would have broken, water would have been polluted and controls over ram 
and beta would bave brokeu down. Biological warfare would probably have 
added to these natural origins of b. 
What of the gwemmenral structure necessary to restore the crucial serv- 
ices? Many d c i a h  would have died, and their replacements wwld be totally 
inexperienced. Martial h w  woufd nominaily be in effect, but there would 
actually be few military 6r e organizatims intact enough to enforce it. PC Nor would help be availab from elsewhere. All of North America and 
Europe wodd be in dire straits, and most of the Northern Hemisphere would 
be strugghg with a massive dose of falhut. Since American retaliation wodd 
have similarly crushed the Soviet Union, neither nation would even be able 
to ask for emergency relief from the other in the traditional pattern of the 
vanauished suine for the victor's heln. 
other work, this catastrophe &odd differ from ~racticdy all  in the 
past in that there would be no social cushion for the injured, the stming, the 
b e d ,  to fall back on. Ahays before, human being in trouble d h~p 
for help from other human beings wbo had not been hurt. But after a full- 
scde thermonuclear war, there would not be enough undamaged ~ i e t i e s  left 
to bring the necessary quick aid. The world's least touched populations wmld 
b thm in the South- Hemisphere; but thme poples, except for Awtr& 
and New Zealand, are also the world's poorest, l e s t  able to &ord the ships, 
the fwd, the medic4 supplies and personnel, and tbe administrative capacity 
necessary to save American lives and society. As for Australia and 'Mew 
Zealand, they are simply too small in population and roo far away to do the 
job in the necessary time. The result would be that most of t h e  who did 
come out of the shelters would die in the next month for lack of the simple 
biological necessitiw and of the social system that could bring these necessi- 
ties to thtm. .. . .
The fa& and destruction would extend even beyond the s d  sy~tem to 
the very physical and biologicd environment in which North American man 
has lived. Dr. John N. Wolfe, chief of the Environmental Scicnces Branch 
of the Atomic Energy Commission, has pointed this out: "Thermal and bht 
eflects, and concomitant radiation, would create vast areas that would be 
useless to the survival of man. Add a h  fire, k t  devastation and dhse ,  
and the picture in many areas becomes grim indeed. Fallout sheltem in such 
areas seem only a means of delaying death." Another biologist, Dr. N. Bentley 
Glass of the J o h  Hoplrins University, bas estimated that after a 7,000- 
megaton attack upon the United States the radioactive soil would be unn& 
to produce edible food for five years. Although there are ways of decontpmi- 
nating such soil, this in itself woufd require work on tbe tnd in WWY SO 
bighty xadioactive that the workers would themselvts be killed. In fact, one 
scientist from the defense-oriented RAND Corporation told the Houdd 
civil defense hearing that once dl life i dimhated from an area, a pint of 
no return is reached at which the h d  kmmm too b d e  for even 
recomuuction. 
Thus if one views the A d a n  people ond the M o d  American continent 
as a social and ecological spfm, in which dl the elements are ia.&td 
and a heavy blow at all of them makes the recovery of any of them d i k d p ,  
one musr cetimatc that a thcrmonuclmr war wwld leave no Americans alive 
to mourn on ia &st PMiversary. 
So far this analysis haa sugpted that civil defense in in no way an asset 
to sumival But is thue any way in which civil defense W act as a Ehwt 
to life? Thexe arc r e v 4  psibilitim that &odd bc explored before tb pm- 
doxicol propsirion can be awsd 
The mast obvious of thae  k associated with the version of counter-farce 
strategy that iocIudw "'strategic evacuation" to huge underground b h t  
Meera It would seem h r  axiomatic that if the Soviet Union had attacked 
a major Western interest and had then been confronted with m AmericPn 
evacuation of c i v h  obvhuplg portending sn dtimarum, the Soviets w d  
attack the United States at once, The rtreanu of refugee c i v h  would 
huwelve-3 constitute the c b r  notification of danger and invitation to 
attack Tbe attempt at  civil defense would its& have signaled the R- 
to begin a &tion-dmroying war. At the snme time, the helplama of 
the civilians during the evacuation i d  w d  makt them more liable to die 
in the b t  momenta of attack Thus civil defense would have defeated its 
own purpose. 
The second way in which civil defense might a c ~ U y  increase the dang#r 
to lives a & explained by a quotadon from the report of thc 
Horiseld Subcommittee on Milit;up Opera*, Ttae Capnmittee pointed at, 
"As we b d d  more &ilw and 'hid i~ to reduce vulndty ,  tbt 
enemy must earmatk bigger n u k  paylo& far e d  t;uget and cosl~emphte 
a larger total *tack This increnses the pomttl f d h t  and otber bazamh far 
Ehe civilian popuIah" From this forxuStiw the HoMefd Subcommittee 
somehow drew the conc lub  that civil, defense should be increased, Othm 
may be pardoned for concluding that any such increase would merely mggtst 
to the enemy that he f w t k  increme I& amck level. Thus an attempt at 
civil d e f a  would bring in an enemy preparation for a larger at- 
tack. As we have just sem proved by the Rwdana, modern technology &= 
it easy tu raise the power of thcrmmuch weapons from the 10 or 20-mgo- 
ton level to 50 or 100 megatom. It is much more &cult and expensive to 
the I d  of p-tim given to civilhns. Tbus civil defense would 
alwap be behind in this spiral, and every incmse in civil defense would merely 
trigger an even larger in the attack capability. Xn tbh kind of mot, 
people will always be k r s ,  d the number of deaths will be inmad.  
Civil defense cannot be defended a measure for pmtecting American 
l iva ThermonuckPr war will be m devastating that a t  best civil defense will. 
only prolong a few & lives for a few wceka or m o n k  By the timc the 
h t  d v e m r y  of the war would roll around, those few million Americana 
would be just aa dead as if they h d  no civil defense at  all. At  wmt, some 
aspxts of c i d  &fcnse rniglu actually increase the toll of e d y  d e a h  in the 
immtdinte hours and &ye r r f ~  stack. In any case, Americana cannot depend 
on civil dcffnse to prwmt &maelves or their m t r y  from dying. 
Civil Dsfmse as a Danger to a Free Emmmy 
Aa the  di&ultia and inndequacics of civil dcfense pre pointed out more 
cIPrlp, pmpmts of civil defense react by urging larger and more expeosive 
program. I t  is &doze relevant ro examine what a larger and larger civil 
defcnsc would do to our economy, How would it affect the w d t h  and well- 
being of private individuals? What wmId it do to our wet-all economic 
growth? What impact would civil defense h e  upon free enterprise as 
against centralized government control of the sonomy? 
Estimates of the a t  of civil defense naturally vary according to what 
kind of program is being advocated. The imiitence of Administration and 
&~~ressiorial proponcnr~ of civil defense that p m m t  activities are mereIy 
a bst  step toward r much k g e i  civil defense &oft suggests that the mum 
to be spent will wmt;mtly incrmse. The HoWld Subcommittee estimad 
that fallout-only heltcrs would c a t  about $100 per space and that a f a b i t  
p m g m  providing orae space for d American would therefore cost about 
$20 billion. Tbe Defense Department, h e r ,  reports that e s h t a  of thc 
c a t  of conutruction of fdout shelm nm from $100 tcr $3 00 gum-' that stocking of the shelter with minimal food and water aupp 'es would run 
appmximady mother $41 $61 per apace. Neither of thcst W t w  
includes the cmt of supportive meaaurw rmch zp food stomge centers, con- 
struction of &breaks, or pmttack  education of the population for civil 
defense. Nor does the $zo-billion estima* in#e the c a t  of constructing mom 
thm one shelter apace for each American, dthough the ummmus daily 
mobility of America would suggest that or thm p e e s  in Merent 
parts of a mmpoIitan prep would bp necessary to meet attacks at  Mmnt 
times of thc day and night. If, as the HoMd Sulxommittce suggests, tbe 
United Statta should begin to build blast &eltern as well as fallout sheitem, 
the costs would be mwmously i n d .  There seam no d& that a 
program of vast underground &cItus suitable for stmtegic evacuation would 
cost in the mnge of at lerst several hundred billian ddlnrs. 
There has been t& that family fallout shelters might cost aa little as $1 50. 
But even a cursory emmination of the kind of shelter that might be built 
for five people at  that price shows that it could not be equipped either with 
oxygen or with a ventilating system capable of admitting air but weening 
out fallout; with fallout-pmf w&, with protection against bre from a 
burning house immediately above, and with f d ,  water, sanitation and 
medicine for two weelm, In shore, p h  for a cheap family sheltw will. 
probably fool not even the  pmpcrive builder for h g .  Although a family 
shelter might rak fewer psychologicat and miological problems tban a com- 
munity shelter, its cast would rule it out for most American f w y  
for the 50% of of ppuhtion wbose f d y  income is under $frOO. Its vexy 
natllie would nJe out apomnent-dwellers. Ad,  of m, the family shelter, 
even if built, could p-t the whok family only a t  night. 
For nU thew rrasons, most supportm of civil defense propase that the 
Federal government pay directly for the major expenses of pubk shelters 
a d  for aupprtive arrangtmenu Iike food storage a d  civil defense tmining, 
d that F e d 4  tax incmtiva encowage the privae budding of f d y  
buainws shelters. In one form or another, ebt money would come out of 
Federal tru reven- or, through ddcit speading, out of in&- If the 
Irumsy c m  directly out of revenue, (aoe oot of rsciw) ,  eithcr mmc 
F e d d  program 0 t h  than civil defense must be c d  or taxa m ~ t  be 
increased. If it comw from spseiat tax reductions given m incentives, either 
otber taxes must bE jPcmd or 0 t h ~  h t i v w  efim;nlted I t  should be noOcd 
that the impct of the t b e ~  of maey to civil dcfen~e could n ~ t  bt ~ p m d  
over a long time. Even tbe minimal $20 billion suggesosd by rhe W e l d  
Sukummitte is aimed a t  protection from current w m ~ .  If a wapops 
revolurion every five yam is assumed (and that M -ti- a-g 
historysince1945 bJ1. the$2O-billionspremdbeobsolete by 1966. Inotber 
words, the $20 on would h e  to be spent in three or four yearn to have 
cven one or two years' vdue, and then P new and mow a+vc civil defa~lt  
would have to lx started immediptely. 
The impacts of the various budget and revenue psibilitiw must be 
examined, If in order to encourage civil defense other tax incentives are 
eliminated, the thrust toward greater industrial &mcy and productivity 
wilI be d d t r a b l y  w#kened. S xhg fy ef- would not even have the by-praduct effect that taryspending dots in pouring new m c h  
a d  new products into the civilian cwmmy. Thus, by endangering the in-- 
ti- toward higher ptoductivity in privatt entctprk, civil defense might 
bring about stagnation in the Ammican econorny iu the face of vigorma 
mpccition from memeas. 
While it b obviously imwble  to soy in advance what segments of the 
population w d d  be hardest hit by a tax increase for c h d  defense or what 
segments of the budget w d  b hanbt hit a m f e r  of money to civil 
defense, certain results would be fairly lid y. Any general tax increase 
wauld bE certain to make molr &cult the st;rres' task of Iiruling money for 
the support of cducauon, Coasidtring the precarious condition or @tion 
of education in the Federal budget, it is a h  likely that o transfer of money 
within the Federal budget would be likely to hurt the education appropria- 
tion. Since A h  education provide the basic motive p e r  in economic 
p w t h  and the myriad to keep frsc enocrprist ping, and since American 
education is altendy in d&ulty, a Wt of funds from education to civil 
&fa wouId probably have &oua long-run effects. If the came from 
anti-deprtssion szfegumb auch aa uacmpIoyment insurance, the m a y ' s  
&cultiea in br&g out of an economic down-dant could be multiplied. 
hdeed, it is &cult to sec how large sums of money could be transferred 
over a short period from any productive area of American life to an unpm 
dttct;~t upe like civil defense witbout h w I p  damaging the stability and 
p r o p  of our free-cnterp* economy. 
Quite separate from tbe danger of economic flagnation would bt the 
danger of centnlizsd governmental control over the economy. A program 
aimed at one f h t  shelter space for every American would xequirc FederPI 
intervention in building regulations, in city plnnning and zoning, in dwtion 
of scarce ma& mi& a prisbable drugs, in loention of new industrial 
*centera away fmm @k militvy targets, in d c e  and factory training 
.procedures in order to insure the d e c t i v m s  of civil defense preparatiom 
ond in a be of other ways through every aook and crznny of the Ammican 
economy. h whipping civil defense into sbapc, it w d d  not be p d l e  to 
~ d t  the e m m d c  interests or convenience of managanent, labor or 
xmaumers, since the over-ridmg criteria would be military, Strict Federal 
m g e m e n t  wwld be wmtial in order to make sure that civil defense would 
rxkt in action, not d v  tm D P ~ .  
Let us laok'at what rh; F&A government might have to order a city 
to do. Merely to secure fallout shelter epacm, huge excavations throughout 
rtae businas and industrid dirtricta would have to be ~lanned for quick and 
lwdy aceas, dug regardless of the necessuy disturbance to normal b u s h ,  
and stocked with large, per+icaIly renewed oupplies of food, water, and 
medicines. If the civil defense pmgram were enough to face the 
probfem of htorms, tk city would have to be ordered to split itself 
into sections divided by huge empty awatcbea of concrete, intended to retard 
the p r o w  of he. (Thm areas c d  be ossd neither as parka nor aa high- 
ways, since both mew snd busks and autumotive gasoline would be highly 
flammable.) Wherever cmcentratioas of population would make it dScult 
for enough shelter apace to be easiry accwaiblc, bnsin- and residentid 
.arm wwld be f o r d  to k t e .  W h e  families b d t  shelters, not merely 
the shelter but the distance between it and the bome and the m a h I s  used 
in building tbe bome wodd have to be FederalIy inspected and controlled, 
since P shelter too near a tm flammable house would be no shelter at all. 
Apartment houses, both old and new, would be required to include adequate 
shelter space fox their tenants. On a number of Mcrent daya thoughout the 
year and at diffeient times of day, shelter-t&g &ills wmId be ordered 
tithwt notice in order to ttst and train the population. Some drills might 
have to exfend over seven1 days in order to train people for hiog in the 
ahelters zs well as getting to them. White m y  single w e  of these Fed& 
interventions might be worked into the pattern of business a d  indwtq 
without great &culty, the combination of them will demand close Federal 
super~ision of the economy to guard against totll economic disruption, 
Business relocations, staggering of work hours, temporary shut-downs and 
c o m d t y  dmntionr would all be Federally domed. 
While it would subject a11 private business to intense Federal regulation 
h d  inspection, tht pmcess of building civil defense wwld preseme at  hast 
the forms of private enterprise. Those planners who expect =me Americans 
to survive and recuperate fmm a thermonuclear war are looking toward the 
~usptnsiorr or abolition of even the forms of free enterprise, Some cconomk 
studiw of post-attack conditiom suggest that govgovunment would be the only 
ps ib le  employer after the war. They argue that government would be 
the only instirution able to offer food, clothing, shelter and other necwsitia 
in exchange for work, and they point aut that the necessary work would be 
construction of such h g e  public nseds as trampon, cwnmdcat im 
and water md amaze mtema " .  
Thus even if private enterprise somehow survived with enwgh ~ C E B  
to pay d its workers in 4 necemitiea, the government w d  have to insist 
on suspension of privare pmjccta in order to  speed up public reconstruction.. 
For at least the period of p t - n t ~ k  emergency, thc onIy employ= would; 
be the State and every citizen would be DTM to do its work. Thc histoy 
of even partid nathmhatim of industry suggests that it would be exuunely 
diBicdt, after m r a f  pars of total nationalization, to bring about n re-. 
to private en-k Thus, men on the mast hopeful predictions of sup 
porters of civil defense, after a thermonudear war a large proportion of 
Americans would have been killed and the rest would be working in a quasi-. 
Communist economy. 
It may be questioned whether tbis nation could h g  endure hdf h d  
and half Red. 
Civil Defense IW ti Dmger to Political Freedom 
Not only free enterprise in the American economy but the political liberties 
of America and of orha nations wouid suffer constriction under the n m i -  
ties of civil defense, Overseas, the constriction would come at second h a d ,  
Concentration on civil defense wodd make much more drfliculc the granting 
of American aid to young and struggling democracies, which need the aid in 
order to make economic progress without dictatorship. The hrsc small step 
in this process lm already been t a b ,  with the assignment of cer& food 
stocks ro civil defense storage centers in the United Staces instead of to Food 
for Peace grants overseas. As the civil defense program gains momentum, 
it wilt become necessary to set aside more and mare f d ,  medicine, con- 
struction tooh and development funds for building and stocking the shehers. 
Not only wiII such an inarruption or reduction in aid damage the chances 
of democracy overseas, but the general implications of an American civil 
defense program might w d  arom ktensc anger in the underdeveloped world. 
To uncommitted and underdeveloped nations, an Amcrican civil defense 
effort would look like a s e b h  attempt to save our own population from the 
eaeets of great-power fouy in unleashing atomic war. Those parts of Asia, 
Africa, and Latin Auurica that would be heavily affected by pout-war 
f a h t  would see themselva as h e a t  victims of such a war, unable to 
dord  the enormom eEorts that would be necessary to protect their own 
people. For this reason, on American &YI defense program might amuse the 
same kind of antagonism in the new nations that the testing of the H-bombs 
has aroused among them. Such antagonism would further hurt American 
chances of exercising political leadenhip among the new nations and would 
therefore damage the chances of political democracy in the uncom- 
mitred world. 
At  home in America, civil defense will have an evcn more direct and 
dangerous impact upon liberties, In c&ct, not merely young men 
but all Americans would be made conscriptir in an army under Pentagon 
control. A program that impinges upon every facet of social and 
life can scarcely do otherwise. Already one local political leader in the 
suburbs of Washington, D, C., has demanded that family sheiten be made 
cornphry, on the ground that any family's failure to build a shelter would 
weaken tbe national military posture. As civil defense picks up steam, such 
comments are sure to be multiplied. With the whole Federal government 
rooking the & the prsmre would soon be put on "'slackers" in much the 
fashion it w a  during World War 1 upw people who failed to p r c b c  
p-ly "wluntarp" Liberty k ids .  
Nor would this be d. Failure, because of apathy or abjection, to take 
part in compuhry civil defense drills would be thought a dangerou~ to 
the community aa fdure to take part in vaccination programs (because for 
the drills to succeed, teamwork wodd be absolutely necesslry). New York 
has h d y  armfed and jailed non-participants, On a larger scale, thm 
might be the danger tbat an entire state would decide civil defense was not 
worth disrupting its Iife and =fuse to enact the necessary local Iaws and 
regulatioar. Would the U p i d  Statw Government permit mch a dangerow 
gap in i~ prepamtima to continue? If not, how c o d  the intimate 
of civil defense be i m p d  without practically putting the state into 
political receivership? 
Nor wwld overt action against civil defea~e be the ody problem. Pubk 
criticism of civil d e f m  would bave the same deleterious dect that ctiticigm 
from the ranks would bave upon the m o d  of an army on the 4 
Attempting to argue against civil defense would probably be equated with 
encouraging a dmftddger. In other words, the i m p t i v e  m i t y  for 
d v c r s a l  d o r t  if civil defense were even to seem practical might impel a 
government committed to civil defense to m p p m  borh opposition to the 
progrlm ad failure to join in it. 
Even supporters of civil defense would have of their liberties redud. 
In an attempt to protect many kinds of civil d e f m  centers from sabotage 
or attack, the loeations and purpabes of such as food smmg d e p y  
emergency government headquamrs or factories producing g d s  crucial 
m the  post-aruck emergency would have to be kt secret. Travel nmr rmch 
places and press reporting a b u t  them would have m be carefully m w i d  
by the Federal government. Thege strictures apply now, of course, to m i l i t q  
installations, but the point is tbat civil defense installadons would be far 
more numerous and far more widely scattered through the  country, and 
restrictions would therefore be far more onerous. 
Them would be other pressures, more subtle but just as real, upon the 
fabric of American political liberty. Our liberty and in fact our nationid 
unity is built upon a web of assumptions about each other as citizens and 
people - assumprim we rarely notice because we practically never question 
them. But already the mere beginnings of civil defense have Ied to loud 
threats from Nevada to shoot down "invading" Californians, to unpublicized 
but uneasy questions about racial segregation or integration in fallout shelters, 
and to angry remarb about the expendability of city residents as against 
suburban or country folk. The question of survivaI, because it involves b t h  
the most inba  perswa1 dispitions and the most pressing national con- 
flicts, will inevitably divide Americans far more sharply than we bave ever 
known. Making concrete decisions about civil defense will rub our old 
divisions to the  raw. 
Fiaally, it should be pointed out thar many who believe some Amexicam 
can survive a thermonuelclr war do not believe that democracy can sumive 
the war. The mast conshnt and outspoken Congressional supporter of civil 
~ ~ c k t ~ , h a a s ~ # d t h a t h e r c c ~ " t h e r e  
wilI ba d law a b t  hvitably," Congressmnn Wllinm Fitts Ryan 
has wondtred whether, if any Amcricam sumive, the United Statts w d d  
e v e r a g a i n b e m ~ t m t i o n - o r e ~ e n w h e t f i c r i t w o u l d b t a s i n ~  
nation or wlit inm component parta m t t d  by wide areas of radioactivity. 
Thw even t h e  who hope that civil defense might save liva have no illwihm 
about the dip& mtlmk for pliticd liberty after a tbermonuclePr war. 
Tbe Twtk lid Mau 
Analyzing a!l the fac- of civil defense h w a  that it would tend to nuke 
tharmonucley war more likely, could not reduce the roll of lmes from such 
a war but might even increase tk immediaEp of death, w d  s u i d y  slow 
h a  American economic growth and d d  gravely damage both political 
and d c  k y .  Civil defense would incrclsc the c b  that k r i c a  
would in im kt years k o m e  a "Red" h t y  and would then die anyway 
uadw thermonuclear attack. 
The dangers and inadequacy of civil defense h l d  be no surprise. Human 
beings have always had before tbem the object feason of the turtle, which 
adopted a civil defense policy millenia ago and has ken unable to progress 
ever since. The price for the one - tud  b h t  shelter has been stagnation in 
an evolutionary backwater. 
W s  ;mceptwrs tmk & other path. Stripping d every static defense 
against the other a n i d ,  man hns competed with his wits and his hibility. 
Man is soft and naked and the turtle h98 P hard protective shell, but mankind 
has made the turtle into a tasty dish. Frabdom has its uses as weU as its joy& 
Whac then would be a "humanaa plicy, a frep man's policy, on civil 
defense? The &st requirement should be frankness. The President should 
-plain clearly to the American people that the nature of thermonuclear 
makes the death of a l l  Americans and olI Russians highly probable 
gen=nudear war s b d d  come. IL should exp& rhac civil defense is 
therefore &as. And be s h o d  publicly vlllMlnce the abandonment of the 
civil defense program. 
Having got rid of one major aspect of tht countet-force strategy, he should 
then scrap all American weapons and p h  tdored to a counter-force or &st- 
strike strategy. H2 should point out to the R u s k s ,  while doing so, that this 
act would give any Russian civil defense program a provocative appearance. 
He shouId also explain that civil defense is as urn& tic in terms of physical 
survival in Russia as in the Unitd Stam.* 
And he should publicly acbowIedge that in scrapping its first-strike 
capability while still psmsing its retaliatory weapons, the United States waa 
* l?lue k n vigorom debace o w  whether the Swiet Uniw now hnr t miour civil d c f w  
program The evidancu iadiwtts that whiile the Soviets have aaincd rhdr p~pulacioa in 
many civildefense rc~huiqw, sbc necernv physical gnpuntionr have nor been made, For 
examplr, no failour rhdtm &t in Soviet apanmrnt b o w  Rdermccs w aubwayr ar 
ddtm ignora ll~f o d y  dm sb- of f d  md dd aock, bunk d maw toilcr frciIi- 
but tb liLdihPod that  cha H-bomb h b d l  would m p o h  the subways w ram t h e  
p p k  in them. R w + h  dim* for v c y  p h t a  gathering of f d  a d  laitcr and 
even aergcncy rbclttt-digging an keytd to rbe wa* tima of slow bombers, not of 
modern miwik. 
Eft with the radiation implications of thme weapons ntld b e  the United 
Smm would thus bt assuming, in effect if mt in incent, a stable dew- 
rent stratem. 
Th ~ G d e n t  should further explain that the stable deterrent, w h e k  
m d y  implied w Aial ly  adopd,  would be uaeful in tk h g  run onfy as 
a bridge toward disarmament, h c e  tcehwbgkal progress will ~ ~ l n c r  or 
htw " d e s t a W  the simaticm by giving thermonuchr wapons to more 
narioas and by breaking through the inwfnugbility of 4 - s a i k t  
weapons like Poluis. 
Tftc President should then tell the S& Union that we would never 
be the f b t  to use rhe  H-bomb. The ainkty of this statement w d  have 
been demonstrated in the repudiation of avil defense and the mpping of 
&st-strike weapons, a safe beginning for and a catalyst to a disarmament 
pmcms. As for the "stable" titterrent strategy which would be at  this point 
mum& from Ameficm w e a p  capab;l;ty, it would not be necessary or 
advisable for the President to comment - yet. Nor would ir be re~wabfe  
for Fhe Preidene to repeat old b t s  of retaliation, since the threaw are 
implied in the weapons themselves and dncc he should be attempting to 
improve the chafe  for disarmament negoeiah, 
Having explained the modern facts of dm& to both muons, the President 
shouId urge the Soviet Union to follow suit in abolishing civil defense and 
repudiating - - counter-force strategy, backing up its repudiation with a scrap- 
ping of first-strike weapons. 
In any case the U p i d  States would abolish its own civil ddellse as a 
futile expense likely to force stagnation nnd coercion u p n  us. 
Our initiatives in abandoning counter-force strategy and abolishing c i d  
defense would greatly improve the atmosphere for negotiation toward dis- 
armament under inspection and controL But our lack of scientific knowledge 
a b u t  the p r e r e q ~ ~ t e s  for disarmament and our constitutional limits on 
presidential power in achieving disarmament w d  make it necessary for 
Congress to understand and nit u p n  the new Jtwtion. 
To begin with, Congress could tiansf- the useless funds at present in the 
civil defense budget to the new Arms Contd and ]Disarmament Agency- 
$300 million to use for such research in the socid and na-1 sciences as 
would apply to  negotiating, achieving and preserving disarmament. A mas- 
sive injection of restarch funds, as Americans have found in the fields of 
military defense, medicine and agricultural productivity, is likely to pay 
amazing dividends; we should try it in the field of disarmament. The money 
now being wasted in civil defeast provides an obvious and appropriate source 
of funds, since in the  long run the only effective civil defense is likeIy to be 
the elimination of the H-bomb. 
Finally, one of the most appealing elemenfs of eiviI defense should be 
made applicable to more worthwhile and practical means of defending 
liberty. Civil defcnse would give every citizen the  feeling that he himself, 
as an individual, is taking action against the threats of tyranny and extinction. 
That the m e t M  being used is unworkable does not mean that the feeling 
of personal participation is valueless. The President and Congras should ask 
those Americam who had considered putting time Md d o r t  and money into 
building a f d y  shelter to put that same time, effort a d  money inro the 
active defense of hlxrty. The Peace Corps is a short step in this &don, 
but the idea could be put to use in orher leas drastic ways. Thw are the 
kinds of programs that arc needed: 
A maja Presidential campaign (like that recently devoted to civa dcf ense) 
enwuraging the giving of such perm-m-person economic and technical aid 
as a CARE package of farm tooh 
Free postage for individual mailin to Asians and Africans of controv~~siaf E and stimulating American used boo and magazines. 
Federally financed teaching ta American tourists of the spoke21 language of 
one major Communist or uuwmmitted nation they were planning to visit. 
Tax deductions for private cont~utiom to the United Nations (and 
perhaps to other international organizations such as NATO and the  Organi- 
zation of American States). 
Partial government support for family one-ywr "adoptio~~s" of children 
frwn overseas, especially from Communist and uncommitted states. 
Federal provision of imporrant Russian, Chinese and other foreign- 
Ianguage publications to private citizens quahied and willing to transla# 
them for u r  by scholars, scientists and foreign policy experts. 
AIl these substitutes for c i d  defense wauld quicken and diversify, rather 
than slow down and cmtralizc, the American economy. All of them would 
encourage rdm than suppm American individuabm and the m e  volunteer 
spirit of frcc men. AiI of them would make less likely, not more, the onset 
of thermonuclear war. They would k worthy and effective h m m  w e a p o w  
based on inreliigence a d  0exiWty-rather than the heavy, hampering 
defense sought by the turtle. 
PoXticaUy, a reversal of present Administration policy on civil defense 
might: be impractical. Powerful grwps wirhin the  Pentagon md major poli- 
tical figures outside the Administration are demanding a stronger civil d e f w  
and wotlld certainly fight an abandonment of it. But if the wiU to reverse 
policy exists, a political way can be found. Congressman Ryan haa proposed 
that a special congressional committee, not committed to supporting civil 
defense, reexamine the whole policy fmm top to bottom. Such a reevaluation 
mighr provide the public understanding on which m inteuigent decision 
about civil defense a u l d  be b a d .  So might a public explanation by the 
President of the long-range implications of the Soviet $0-megaton bnmb. 
Other ways might be found. 
But somehow, before it is too late, the American peopIe must lcarn tbis: 
There are no fronriers--old or new--underground In the thermonuclear age, 
there am no defea~es underground, either. 
@ 1961 by Arthur Waskow 
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